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Abstract
We consider voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a contin-
uum of voters with elliptic preferences. Assuming continuity, γ-strategy-
proofness – meaning that coalitions of size smaller or equal to a small
number γ cannot manipulate – and unanimity, we show that such rules
are decomposable into one-dimensional rules. Requiring, additionally,
anonymity leads to an impossibility result. The paper can be seen as an
extension of the model of Border and Jordan (1983) to a continuum of vot-
ers. Contrary, however, to their finite case where single voters are atoms,
in our model with nonatomic voters even a small amount of strategy-
proofness leads to an impossibility.
1 Introduction
We consider voting rules for situations with a large number of voters, who have
single-peaked preferences on a multidimensional policy space. We assume that
the voters actually constitute a continuum, more precisely, they are elements
of a nonatomic measure space. This is a good approximation of a situation
with very many voters, such as for instance national elections, and makes it
possible to accommodate the fact that in such situations small coalitions have
no or only little influence. The policy space is represented by the hypercube
[0, 1]k. Single-peakedness of preferences means that each voter has an ideal
point, and preference decreases when moving away from this point. Specifically,
we assume that preferences are separable quadratic, i.e., have elliptic indifference
curves: this leaves sufficient room to model trade-offs between policies (criteria,
coordinates) while potentially allowing for reasonable voting rules.
∗All authors are members of the Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht Uni-
versity, The Netherlands, http://www.fdewb.unimaas.nl/ke.
Email addresses: H.Peters@maastrichtuniversity.nl, S.Roy@maastrichtuniversity.nl,
T.Storcken@maastrichtuniversity.nl.
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Our model extends the model of Border and Jordan (1983), where the num-
ber of voters is finite, to a continuum of voters.1 Border and Jordan impose
strategy-proofness and unanimity on a voting rule and obtain decomposability:
such a voting rule is completely determined by one-dimensional voting rules
applied to each coordinate separately, and these one-dimensional voting rules
are of the type as characterized earlier in Moulin (1980). It is well-known that,
although these one-dimensional voting rules are group-strategy proof (cannot
be manipulated by coalitions of voters) this property is lost as soon as the di-
mension is higher than one. See, recently, Barbera`, Berga, and Moreno (2010).
In our model, manipulation by single voters is not possible since single voters
do not have any influence. Instead, we impose that coalitions of positive but
small size cannot manipulate, and call this condition γ-strategy-proofness, where
γ is a small but positive number. We also impose unanimity and a weak con-
tinuity condition (based, technically, on convergence in measure). Like Border
and Jordan (1983) we obtain decomposability of the rule into one-dimensional
rules. Under the additional condition of anonymity, these one-dimensional rules
are those characterized by Maus, Peters, and Storcken (2006). However, any
composition of such rules for higher dimensions fails to be γ-strategy-proof for
any γ > 0. Thus, we obtain an impossibility result: there is no unanimous,
anonymous and continuous rule for more than one dimension which is non-
manipulable, even if we require this only for coalitions of arbitrarily small size.
These results can be considered to be in line with what is known in the
literature. We obtain decomposability just as Border and Jordan (1983), but
contrary to them we obtain from this an impossibility result since, basically, our
strategy-proofness condition is one of group strategy-proofness. Thus, and in
contrast to Border and Jordan, our main conclusion is that in situations with
a large number of voters there is no scope for even a weak form of strategy-
proofness under reasonable additional conditions. From a technical point of
view, although our proofs share elements with proofs in Border and Jordan
(1983), they are nevertheless considerably different, due to the possibility of
coalitions of any arbitrary size instead of a finite number of ‘atomic’ players.
In Section 2 the model is introduced, Section 3 deals with the one-dimensional
case, and Section 4 presents the mentioned decomposability and impossibility
results. Section 5 contains a few concluding remarks about the tightness of the
imposed conditions.
2 Preliminaries
Let (Ω,Σ, λ) be a nonatomic measure space. Every t ∈ Ω is a voter and every
element S of the σ-field Σ is a coalition. The nonnegative number λ(S) is inter-
preted as the size of S. We assume that Ω has positive measure and normalize
its size to one: λ(Ω) = 1.
1We only mention the directly relevant literature here. For an extensive survey, see Barbera`
(2010).
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The set of alternatives is the hypercube A = [0, 1]k, where k ∈ N. Let Q
denote the set of all elliptic preferences on A, i.e., binary relations representable
by a utility function of the form x 7→ −
∑k
j=1 wj(xj−pj)
2, x = (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ A,
for some peak p = (p1, . . . , pk) ∈ A and vector of positive weights w ∈W , where
W = {(w1, . . . , wk) ∈ R
k
++ | max{w1, . . . , wk} = 1}. Such a preference can be
identified with the pair (p,w) ∈ A×W , and Q with the set A×W . We endow
Q = A×W with the Borel σ-field.
A profile is a measurable function R : Ω → Q. Thus, in a profile R every
voter t is endowed with an elliptic preference R(t) ∈ Q. The peak and weight
vector of R(t) are denoted by p(R(t)) and w(R(t)). The set of all profiles is
denoted by ρ. Every R ∈ ρ induces a (probability) measure λR on A by defining
λR(B) = λ({t ∈ Ω | p(R(t)) ∈ B}) for every measurable subset B of A. This
measure λR represents the distribution of the peaks of the votes resulting from
an election where every voter t ∈ Ω votes according to R(t).
Let J be some ordered index set. A collection of profiles (Rj)j∈J converges
to a profile R if (λ({t ∈ Ω | Rj(t) 6= R(t)}))j∈J converges to 0.
2
A voting rule or briefly rule is a map F : ρ→ A.
A rule F is anonymous if F (R) = F (R˜) for all R, R˜ ∈ ρ such that λ({t ∈
Ω | R(t) ∈ Q}) = λ({t ∈ Ω | R′(t) ∈ Q}) for every measurable subset Q of Q.
A rule F is unanimous if F (R) = p for all R ∈ ρ such that there is a
(p,w) ∈ Q satisfying R(t) = (p,w) for all t ∈ Ω.
A rule F is continuous if (F (Rj))j∈J converges to F (R) whenever the col-
lection of profiles (Rj)j∈J (where J is an ordered index set) converges to R ∈ ρ.
Observe that continuity of a rule F implies that coalitions of size zero and
in particular single voters are powerless: that is, F (R) = F (R˜) whenever
λ({t ∈ Ω | R(t) 6= R˜(t)}) = 0. This is a very weak continuity condition: it
does not imply anything if each voter’s preferences in two different profiles are
very close.
Let γ ∈ R, 0 < γ ≤ 1. A rule F is γ-manipulable by a coalition S at a profile
R ∈ ρ if λ(S) ≤ γ and there is a profile R˜ ∈ ρ with R˜(t) = R(t) for all t ∈ Ω\S
such that F (R˜)P (t)F (R) for all t ∈ S, where P (t) denotes the asymmetric part
of R(t). A rule F is γ-strategy-proof (γ-SP) if it is not γ-manipulable by any
coalition S at any profile R.
3 The one-dimensional case
In the one-dimensional case (k = 1) preferences are completely determined
by their peaks. Therefore, we can identify Q with the set A = [0, 1] and ρ
with the set [0, 1]Ω. In this case, γ-SP implies that no coalition of any size
can manipulate, as the following lemma shows. The proof of this lemma is
illustrated in Figure 1.
Lemma 1 Let k = 1, let 0 < γ ≤ 1, and let F be continuous and γ-SP. Then
F is γ′-SP for every γ′ ∈ (0, 1].
2This is convergence in measure.
3
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Figure 1. Illustrating the proof of Lemma 1. The number α is the midpoint between
F (R) and F (R′). All voters in S have their peaks to the right of α.
Proof. Let γ′ ∈ (0, 1]. If γ′ ≤ γ then clearly F is γ′-SP. Now assume γ′ >
γ and for contradiction suppose that F is γ′-manipulable by some coalition
S ∈ Σ at profile R ∈ ρ. Then γ < λ(S) ≤ γ′ and there is a profile R′ with
R′(t) = R(t) for all t ∈ Ω\S such that F (R′)P (t)F (R) for all t ∈ S. Hence
F (R′) 6= F (R), w.l.o.g.3 F (R′) > F (R). Then p(R(t)) > α for all t ∈ S, where
α := 1
2
(F (R) + F (R′)), since each R(t) is a symmetric single-peaked preference
on A = [0, 1].
For each 0 ≤ β ≤ γ′ let Sβ ⊆ S with λ(Sβ) = β and such that Sβ ⊆ Sβ
′
whenever β ≤ β′; this is possible since λ is nonatomic. Let Rβ be defined by
Rβ(t) = R′(t) for t ∈ Sβ and Rβ(t) = R(t) for t ∈ Ω\Sβ . Let β¯ := max{0 ≤
β ≤ γ′ | F (Rβ) = F (R)}. Then β¯ is well-defined by continuity of F , β¯ < γ′
and F (Rβ) > F (R) = F (Rβ¯) for all β > β¯. Again by continuity of F there is
a δ < min{γ, γ′ − β¯} such that F (Rβ¯+δ) < α. This implies that the coalition
Sβ¯+δ\Sβ¯ γ-manipulates F at Rβ¯ , a contradiction. 
We call a one-dimensional rule F strategy-proof if it is γ-SP for every γ ∈
(0, 1]. By Lemma 1, every one-dimensional γ-SP rule F is strategy-proof. In
Maus, Peters, and Storcken (2006) all continuous, unanimous, anonymous and
strategy-proof one-dimensional rules have been characterized.4 In this charac-
terization, a central role is played by the family F of all nondecreasing (i.e.,
weakly increasing) and continuous functions f : [0, 1] → A with f(0) = 0 and
f(1) = 1. Let f ∈ F . We define a rule F f associated with f , as follows.
(See Figure 2 later on for an illustration.) Let R ∈ ρ. Consider the induced
decumulative distribution DR defined by DR(x) := λR([x, 1]) for all x ∈ A.
Now
F f (R) := max{x ∈ A | f(DR(x)) ≥ x}. (1)
The rule F f is well-defined since the set of which the maximum is taken is
nonempty (it contains x = 0), f is continuous and DR is left-continuous. The
mentioned characterization is as follows.
Theorem 1 Let k = 1. A rule F is continuous, unanimous, strategy-proof and
anonymous if and only if there is an f ∈ F such that F = F f .
3Without loss of generality.
4Maus, Peters, and Storcken (2006) use the stronger property of Pareto optimality but
it is easy to check that their characterization still holds with unanimity instead of Pareto
optimality.
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Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 imply the following result.
Corollary 1 Let k = 1 and 0 < γ ≤ 1. A rule F is continuous, unanimous,
γ-SP and anonymous if and only if there is an f ∈ F such that F = F f .
4 The general case: decomposability and impos-
sibility
The main result of this section and of the paper is the following decomposability
theorem.
Theorem 2 Let 0 < γ ≤ 1. If a rule F is continuous, unanimous, and γ-
SP then for each j = 1, . . . , k there is a continuous, unanimous and γ-SP rule
F j : [0, 1]Ω → [0, 1] such that for all R = (p(t), w(t))t∈Ω ∈ ρ,
Fj(R) = F
j((pj(t))t∈Ω) for each j = 1, . . . , k .
Proof. See Appendix. 
Theorem 2 implies in particular that a rule with the mentioned properties
is peaks-only, i.e., depends only on the peaks and not on the weight vectors of
the preferences. Unfortunately, requiring, in addition, anonymity leads to an
impossibility, as the following result shows.
Theorem 3 Let 0 < γ ≤ 1 and let k ≥ 2. There is no rule F that is continuous,
unanimous, anonymous, and γ-SP.
Proof. Suppose F is a continuous, unanimous, anonymous, and γ-SP rule.
Then by Theorem 2 and Corollary 1, there are fj ∈ F , j = 1, . . . , k, such that
for all R = (p(t), w(t))t∈Ω ∈ ρ,
Fj(R) = F
fj ((pj(t))t∈Ω) for each j = 1, . . . , k . (2)
We show, for contradiction, that a rule F given by (2) is not γ-SP. We as-
sume k = 2, the construction that follows can easily be embedded in higher
dimensions.
First, choose numbers α, β, and ε such that
• 0 < α < α+ ε < 1 and 0 < β − ε < β < 1
• f1(ξ) > f1(α) for all ξ ∈ (α, α+ ε)
• f2(ξ) < f2(β) for all ξ ∈ (β − ε, β).
This is possible since f1, f2 ∈ F , i.e., f1 : [0, 1] → [0, 1] and f2 : [0, 1] →
[0, 1] are nondecreasing and continuous functions with f1(0) = f2(0) = 0 and
f1(1) = f2(1) = 1. Let δ be a number such that 0 < δ < 1 and 1 − α − β <
δ < min{1 − α, 1 − β}. Let Ω be partitioned into coalitions S00, S10, S01,
5
j = 1
x1
α
y1
α+ γ1
f1
t
t
t
j = 2
y2
t
x2
tβ
β − γ2
f2
t
Figure 2. Illustrating the proof of Theorem 3. In the left diagram, the thick black
curve represents the decumulative distribution of λ1, and the grey curve the distri-
bution resulting from manipulation by T00 ∪ T11. The right diagram illustrates the
situation for the second coordinate, with similar explanation.
and S11 such that λ(S00) = δ, λ(S10) = 1 − β − δ, λ(S01) = 1 − α − δ, and
λ(S11) = δ + α+ β − 1. Consider a profile R such that
p(R(t)) =


(0, 0) if t ∈ S00
(1, 0) if t ∈ S10
(0, 1) if t ∈ S01
(0, 0) if t ∈ S00
for all t ∈ Ω .
Some of the weight vectors are chosen later in the proof, but they do not influ-
ence F (R), since F is peaks-only.
Let λ1 denote the marginal probability measure on the set of first coor-
dinates [0, 1] induced by R. Then λ1(0) = 1 − α and λ(1) = α. Therefore,
F f
1
((p1(R(t)))t∈Ω) = f
1(α). Similarly we derive F f
2
((p2(R(t)))t∈Ω) = f
2(β).
Write x1 = f
1(α) and x2 = f
2(β), then F (R) = (x1, x2). See Figure 2 for an
illustration.
We now show that F can be γ-manipulated at R. Let 0 < γ1, γ2 < ε such
that γ1 + γ2 ≤ γ, γ1 < δ = λ(S00), and γ
2 < δ + α + β − 1 = λ(S11). Let
T00 ⊆ S00 with λ(T00) = γ
1 and let T11 ⊆ S11 with λ(T11) = γ
2. Now consider
a profile R′ with p(R′(t)) = (1, 0) for all t ∈ T00 ∪ T11, and with p(R
′(t)) =
p(R(t)) for all other t. Then F (R′) = (y1, y2) where y1 = f
1(α+ γ1) > x1 and
y2 = f
2(β − γ2) < y2. Now it is straightforward to find a weight vector for the
voters in T00 such that yP (t)x for all t ∈ T00, and a weight vector for the voters
in T11 such that yP (t)x for all t ∈ T11; this boils down to constructing two
ellipses with centers at (0, 0 and at (1, 1) respectively, both crossing through x
and having y in the interior. But this means that T00 ∪ T11 can γ-manipulate
F at R by changing their preferences to R′. 
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5 Concluding remarks
How tight is our impossibility result (Theorem 3)? We conjecture that dropping
anonymity is not going to change the result in an essential way and may only
lead to some kind of ‘invisible dictator’ result, as in Kirman and Sondermann
(1972). Moreover, anonymity is a compelling condition in many settings.
More interestingly, dropping continuity may allow for rules which perhaps
do not offer real compromises but at least are not dictatorial in any way. An
example of such a rule is to choose the left or right endpoint of the support of
a profile on each coordinate separately by using majority voting.
Finally, changing the domain of preferences will in general only make it more
difficult to find strategy-proof voting rules, cf. Zhou (1991) for the case of finitely
many voters.
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2
We recall that the support of a probability measure µ on A is the set of all points
in A such that every open neighborhood of such a point has positive measure.
Equivalently, it is the smallest (in terms of set inclusion) closed subset that has
measure 1. We denote the support of µ by supp(µ) and for j = 1, . . . , k we
define the set suppj(µ) by suppj(µ) = {α ∈ R | α = xj for some x ∈ supp(µ)}.
Thus, suppj(µ) is the projection of supp(µ) on the j-th coordinate.
For a subset X of some Euclidean space we denote by conv(X) the convex
hull of X, i.e., the smallest convex set containing X. The first lemma shows
that a continuous, unanimous and γ-SP rule assigns to each profile a point each
coordinate of which is in the projection on that coordinate of the support of the
probability measure generated by the profile.
Lemma 2 Let 0 < γ ≤ 1. Let F be continuous, unanimous and γ-SP, and let
R ∈ ρ. Then Fj(R) ∈ conv(suppj(λR)) for each j = 1, . . . , k.
Proof. (a) First, suppose that there is an ω > 0 such that wj(t) > α for all
j = 1, . . . , k and all t ∈ Ω, where R(t) = (p(t), w(t)). Suppose, for a contra-
diction, that F1(R) < r1 where [r1, r2] = conv(suppj(λR)). Let p := (
1
2
(r1 +
F1(R)), F2(R), . . . , Fk(R)) ∈ A and for each δ > 0 let w(δ) = (δ, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ W .
Let
E(δ) := {x ∈ A |
k∑
j=1
wj(δ)(xj − pj)
2 ≤
k∑
j=1
wj(δ)(Fj(R)− pj)
2}
denote the set of points weakly preferred to F (R) by a voter with preference
(p,w(δ)). We first prove the following claim.
Claim. Let 0 < ε < 1
2
(r1 − F1(R)). Then there is a δ > 0 such that for all
x ∈ E(δ) with x1 + ε < p1 and all y ∈ E(δ) with y1 = x1 + ε, we have yP (t)x
for all t ∈ Ω.
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Proof. We have to show that there is a δ > 0 such that for all t ∈ Ω and all x
and y as in the claim the following inequality holds:
w1((x1 + ε)− q1)
2 +
k∑
j=2
wj(yj − qj)
2 < w1(x1 − q1)
2 +
k∑
j=2
wj(xj − qj)
2 ,
where (w, q) = R(t). This inequality is equivalent to
w1[((x1 + ε)− q1)
2 − (x1 − q1)
2] <
k∑
j=2
wj [(xj − qj)
2 − (yj − qj)
2] .
Since x, y ∈ A(δ), the absolute value of the expression at the right-hand side
of this inequality can be made uniformly small (that is, for all (q, w) ∈ Q) by
choosing δ small. The expression at the left-hand side is negative but bounded
away from zero:
w1[((x1 + ε)− q1)
2 − (x1 − q1)
2] = w1[(q1 − x1 − ε)
2 − (q1 − x1)
2]
= −εw1[2(q1 − x1)− ε]
< −εw1[2(r1 − p1) + ε]
< −εω[2(r1 − p1) + ε] .
This concludes the proof of the Claim.
Let m be the smallest integer larger than 1/γ, let ε < (p1−F1(R))/m, and take
δ as in the Claim. Take S1, . . . , Sm ∈ Σ pairwise disjoint with λ(Si) = γ for
i = 1, . . . ,m− 1 and λ(Sm) = 1− (m− 1)γ ≤ γ. Let S0 = ∅. For i = 0, . . . ,m
define Ri ∈ ρ by Ri(t) = (p,w(δ)) for all t ∈ ∪iℓ=0S
ℓ and Ri(t) = R(t) for all
remaining t. By γ-SP, F (R1) ∈ E(δ) otherwise S1 can γ-manipulate F at R1.
By the choice of δ as in the Claim, we have F1(R
1) < F1(R)+ε otherwise S1 can
γ-manipulate F at R0 = R. Again by γ-SP and the fact that F (R1) ∈ E(δ), we
have F (R2) ∈ E(δ) otherwise S2 can γ-manipulate F at R2. Again by the choice
of δ as in the Claim, we have F1(R
2) < F1(R
1) + ε < F1(R) + 2ε otherwise S2
can γ-manipulate F at R1. By performing this step m times in total we obtain
for the profile Rm that F1(R
m) < F1(R) +mε < p1. By unanimity, however,
F (Rm) = p, a contradiction.
(b) Now let R ∈ ρ be arbitrary. For w ∈ W and n ∈ N define wn ∈ W by
wnj = wj if wj ≥ 1/n and w
n
j = 1/n if wj < 1/n, for all j = 1, . . . , k. For each
n ∈ N define Rn ∈ ρ by Rn(t) = (p(t), wn(t)) if R(t) = (p(t), w(t)), for all t ∈ Ω.
We claim that Rn → R for n → ∞. If not, then let S1 ⊇ S2 ⊇ . . . be defined
by Sn = {t ∈ Ω | Rn(t) 6= R(t)} for all n. Then there is a δ > 0 such that
λ (∩n∈NS
n) ≥ δ, so that in particular ∩n∈NS
n 6= ∅. Take t ∈ ∩n∈NS
n and let
R(t) = (p(t), w(t), then there is some j with wj(t) = 0, a contradiction since
w(t) ∈W .
By part (a) of the proof, Fj(R
n) ∈ conv(suppj(λRn)) = conv(suppj(λR))
for each j = 1, . . . , k and all n ∈ N. By continuity of F , this implies Fj(R) ∈
conv(suppj(λR)) for each j = 1, . . . , k. 
8
The following lemma shows that a continuous, unanimous and γ-SP rule is
peaks-only when restricted to profiles that live on only one coordinate.
Lemma 3 Let 0 < γ ≤ 1 and let F be unanimous, continuous and γ-SP. Let
R = (p(t), w(t))t∈Ω, R
′ = (p(t), w′(t))t∈Ω ∈ ρ and j ∈ {1, . . . , k} be such that
pℓ(t) = pℓ(t
′) for all ℓ 6= j and t, t′ ∈ Ω. Then F (R) = F (R′).
Proof. W.l.o.g. let j = 1. Take ε > 0 and let S = {t ∈ Ω | p1(t) < F1(R) −
ε}. We prove that F (Q) = F (R) for the profile Q with Q(t) = (p(t), w′(t))
for all t ∈ S and Q(t) = (p(t), w(t)) for all t ∈ Ω\S. Then, since ε > 0 is
arbitrary, it follows by continuity of F that F (R′′) = F (R) for the profile R′′
with R′′(t) = (p(t), w′(t)) for all t with p1(t) ≤ F1(R) and R
′′(t) = (p(t), w(t))
for all other t. By repeating the argument for voters t with p1(t) > F1(R), we
obtain F (R′) = F (R) and the proof is complete.
We are done if λ(S) = 0. Now assume λ(S) = β¯ > 0, and for each 0 ≤ β ≤ β¯
let Sβ ⊆ Ω such that (i) λ(Sβ) = β and (ii) Sβ ⊆ Sβ
′
whenever β ≤ β′
(this is possible since λ is nonatomic). For each 0 ≤ β ≤ β¯ define the profile
Rβ by Rβ(t) = (p(t), w′(t)) for all t ∈ Sβ and Rβ(t) = (p(t), w(t)) for all
t ∈ Ω\Sβ . By Lemma 2, Fℓ(R
β) = Fℓ(R) for all ℓ 6= 1. Let α = max{0 ≤
β ≤ β¯ | F1(R
β) = F1(R)}. If α < β¯, take a number α
′ with α < α′ ≤ β¯,
α′ ≤ α+ γ, and such that F1(R
α′) > F1(R)−
1
2
ε: this is possible by continuity
of F . If F1(R
α′) < F1(R) then coalition S
α′\Sα can γ-manipulate F at Rα; if
F1(R
α′) > F1(R) then coalition S
α′\Sα can γ-manipulate F at Rα
′
. Hence, we
have α = β¯, so F (Q) = F (Rβ¯) = F (R). 
The next lemma presents a technical result, which will be used in the proof
of Lemma 5 below.
Lemma 4 Let k ≥ 2 and 0 < ε < 1. Then there is a δ > 0 such that for all
p, x, y ∈ A with either p1 ≤ y1 ≤ x1 − ε or p1 ≥ y1 ≥ x1 + ε we have yP (t)x,
where P (t) is the asymmetric part of R(t) = (p, (1, δ, . . . , δ)) ∈ Q.
Proof. Take δ < ε2/(k− 1) and let p, x, y ∈ A with p1 ≤ y1 ≤ x1− ε (the other
case is analogous). Then yP (t)x is equivalent to
δ

 k∑
j=2
(yj − pj)
2 −
k∑
j=2
(xj − pj)
2

 < (x1 − p1)2 − (y1 − p1)2 . (3)
The left-hand side of this equation is smaller than δ(k − 1). For the right-hand
side we have
(x1 − p1)
2 − (y1 − p1)
2 ≥ (y1 + ε− p1)
2 − (y1 − p1)
2
= ε(2y1 − 2p1 + ε)
≥ ε2 .
Equation (3) now follows since δ(k − 1) < ε2. 
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The next lemma is the crucial lemma for the proof of Theorem 2. It says
that the j-th coordinate of the point assigned to a profile by a unanimous,
anonymous and γ-SP rule depends only on the j-th coordinates of the peaks of
the voters.
Lemma 5 Let 0 < γ ≤ 1 and let F be unanimous, continuous and γ-SP.
Let k ≥ 2, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and let R,R′ ∈ ρ with R(t) = (p(t), w(t)) and
R′(t) = (p′(t), w′(t)) for each t ∈ Ω such that p′j(t) = pj(t) and p
′
ℓ(t) = 0 for all
t ∈ Ω and ℓ 6= j. Then Fj(R
′) = Fj(R).
Proof. W.l.o.g. assume j = 1. Let m be the smallest integer larger than or
equal to 1/γ. Choose α > 0 arbitrary. Choose ε > 0 arbitrary but with
ε < α/(m + 2). By Lemma 4 we can choose δ > 0 such that for all p, x, y ∈ A
with either p1 ≤ y1 ≤ x1 − ε or p1 ≥ y1 ≥ x1 + ε we have that a voter with
preference (p, (1, δ, . . . , δ)) ∈ Q strictly prefers y to x. Let Q be the profile with
Q(t) = (p′(t), (1, δ, . . . , δ) for all t ∈ Ω.
First consider the set of voters S1 with p1(R(t)) ≤ F1(R(t))−α for all t ∈ S
1.
Let λ(S1) = β1 and let m1 be the smallest integer larger than or equal to β1/γ.
By applying γ-SP m1 times, each time changing the preferences of voters t in
a subset of S1 of size at most γ from R(t) to Q(t), we obtain for the profile
R1, defined by R1(t) = Q(t) for t ∈ S1 and R1(t) = R(t) for t ∈ Ω\S1, that
|F1(R
1)− F1(R)| < m1ε by the choice of δ.
Second, consider the set of voters S2 with p1(R(t)) ≥ F1(R(t)) + α for all
t ∈ S2. Let λ(S2) = β2 and let m2 be the smallest integer larger than or
equal to β2/γ. Repeat the above argument to obtain a profile R
2, defined by
R2(t) = Q(t) for all t ∈ S2 ∪ S1 and R2(t) = R(t) for all t /∈ S2 ∪ S1, and such
that |F1(R
2) − F1(R
1)| < m2ε, hence |F1(R
2) − F1(R)| < (m1 +m2)ε. Hence,
F1(R
2) is a number in the interval (F1(R)− (m1 +m2)ε, F1(R) + (m1 +m2)ε).
Finally, change the preferences of the remaining voters t, those in Ω\(S1 ∪
S2), from R(t) to Q(t). Let m3 be the smallest integer larger than or equal to
(1− β1 − β2)/γ. By γ-SP it now follows that F1(Q) is a number in the interval
(F1(R)−(m1+m2+m3)ε, F1(R)+(m1+m2+m3)ε). Sincem1+m2+m3 ≤ m+2,
we have |F1(Q)− F1(R)| < (m+ 2)ε < α.
By Lemma 3 we have F (R′) = F (Q), so in particular |F1(R
′)−F1(R)| < (m+
2)ε < α. Since this holds for every α > 0 we conclude that F1(R) = F1(R
′). 
Proof of Theorem 2. Let F be continuous, unanimous, and γ-SP. For each
j = 1, . . . , k define F j : [0, 1]Ω → [0, 1] by F j((x(t))t∈Ω) = F (R
xj ) for each
(x(t))t∈Ω ∈ [0, 1]
Ω, where Rx
j
∈ ρ is some profile with pj(R
xj (t)) = x(t) and
pℓ(R
xj (t)) = 0 for all ℓ 6= j and t ∈ Ω. Then F j is well-defined because of
Lemma 3, and F j inherits continuity, unanimity, and γ-SP from F . The proof
of the theorem is complete by applying Lemma 5. 
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